The 12th Judicial Package: Key Amendments Introduced by Law No. 7589
Law No. 7589 on Amendments to Certain Laws Concerning the Effective and Efficient Functioning of the Judiciary, dated 16 July 2026 [“the Law”], was published in the Official Gazette of 31 July 2026 and entered into force on the same date. Publicly known as the “12th Judicial Package”, the Law amends nine principal statutes, foremost among them the Code of Civil Procedure, the Turkish Code of Obligations, the Code of Criminal Procedure, the Turkish Penal Code, the Enforcement and Bankruptcy Law and Law No. 3095.
Perhaps the most striking of the amendments is the repeal of Article 107 of the Code of Civil Procedure No. 6100 [“CCP”], which brings the action for an unquantified debt to an end. The distinction between the action for an unquantified debt and the partial action, which throughout its fifteen years of application gave rise to intense debate in the doctrine and in judicial decisions and to procedural difficulties in practice, has been terminated by transposing the essential functions of the former into the framework of the partial action.
The Law has further replaced the fixed statutory interest rate, long inadequate in the face of prevailing economic conditions, with a variable structure tied to the rediscount rate of the Central Bank of the Republic of Türkiye. The purpose underlying the introduction of the action for an unquantified debt, the difficulties encountered in its application and the debate in the doctrine are examined first below, followed by an analysis of the new regime and of the other significant amendments introduced by the Law.
I. ABOLITION OF THE ACTION FOR AN UNQUANTIFIED DEBT AND RESTRUCTURING OF THE PARTIAL ACTION
A. The Purpose Underlying the Institution
The action for an unquantified debt was introduced into Turkish law by Article 107 of the CCP as an institution modelled on Article 85 of the Swiss Code of Civil Procedure. Following the repeal of Article 107 by Law No. 7589, no separate cause of action bearing that name subsists. The essential purpose of the institution was to secure the creditor’s right of access to justice in those cases where the amount in dispute could not be determined at the outset.
Indeed, the rationale of the Justice Committee accompanying the provision states that an action for an unquantified debt may be brought where the creditor, although able to know and establish the minimum amount claimable, is unable to determine the entirety of the claim with precision.[1]
The procedural advantages afforded by the institution may be grouped under three heads: (i) the action could be commenced over a minimum amount and thus at a reduced court fee; (ii) upon determination of the claim in the course of the proceedings, the claimant could increase its claim without being subject to the prohibition on the extension of claims; and (iii) unlike in a partial action, the limitation period was deemed interrupted, as at the date of the action, in respect of the claim in its entirety.
B. Difficulties Encountered in Practice
The application of the institution, however, never attained the anticipated stability. The principal difficulty lay in the impossibility of settling which claims might be regarded as “unquantified”. While it was accepted that an action for an unquantified debt could not be brought where the subject matter of the dispute was quantified or quantifiable, and that any such action, if nonetheless brought, would be dismissed for want of a condition of action by reason of the absence of a legal interest in bringing it, the manner in which the criterion of quantifiability was to be applied to the facts of a given case remained a constant source of dispute.
This uncertainty manifested itself most acutely in respect of employment claims. The Court of Cassation held that it would be as incorrect to assert in absolute terms that the subject matter of an employment claim is, by its very nature, undisputed between the parties or manifestly quantified as it would be to accept the contrary, and that the assessment of quantifiability must be made according to the particular circumstances of each case.
A matter giving rise to more serious consequences was the divergence of approach between the chambers. Where an action for an unquantified debt was brought in respect of a quantified claim, certain chambers regarded this as a curable condition of action and held that time should be granted to the claimant to remedy it[2], whereas others concluded that the action was to be dismissed outright for want of a legal interest in bringing it[3]. The consequence was that the fate of an action came to depend upon the chamber to which the file happened to be allocated.
C. The New Regime
Law No. 7589 repealed Article 107 of the CCP and, in its place, inserted a new paragraph into Article 109 providing that, in a partial action, the amount claimed may be increased on one occasion only within the same proceedings, free from the prohibition on the extension of claims, at any time until the conclusion of the examination stage. In respect of the increased portion, the limitation period is likewise deemed interrupted as at the date of the action.
The legislature has thus transposed into the framework of the partial action the two principal advantages formerly afforded by the action for an unquantified debt, namely exemption from the prohibition on the extension of claims and interruption of the limitation period in respect of the claim in its entirety. In this respect, the new regime consolidates the essential functions of the action for an unquantified debt within the partial action.
Pursuant to the transitional provision, actions commenced as actions for an unquantified debt before the date on which the Law entered into force and still pending shall continue to be conducted in accordance with the former Article 107.
II. RE-DETERMINATION OF THE STATUTORY INTEREST RATE
Article 1 of Law No. 3095 has been amended so that the statutory interest rate, rather than being fixed at a given percentage, is now set at eighty per cent of the short-term rediscount rate of the Central Bank of the Republic of Türkiye as at 31 December of the preceding year. Provision is further made for an interim adjustment in respect of the second half of the year where, as at 30 June, that rate differs from the rate of 31 December by five points or more.
The amendment has its background in the inadequacy of the fixed statutory rate to preserve the real value of a claim, particularly in a high-inflation environment. Indeed, the judgment of the Constitutional Court dated 22 July 2025, Case No. 2024/24, Decision No. 2025/164, exposed this difficulty at the constitutional level. By that judgment, Article 1 of Law No. 3095 was found contrary to the Constitution and annulled in so far as it concerned obligations not arising from contract. In the view of the Court, statutory interest fulfils its function only in so far as it is capable of compensating for the appreciable loss in value caused by inflation over the period between the date on which entitlement to the claim arose and the date of payment; the rate of twelve per cent failing to meet that function, the provision was annulled.[4] In order to forestall any resulting lacuna in the law, the entry into force of the annulment was deferred to nine months following publication of the judgment in the Official Gazette.
For our detailed assessment of that judgment of the Constitutional Court, reference may be made to our article of December 2025.
III. COMMENCEMENT OF INTEREST IN AWARDS FOR LOSS OF PHYSICAL CAPACITY AND LOSS OF SUPPORT
By the amendment made to Article 55 of the Turkish Code of Obligations, the commencement of interest in awards for loss of physical capacity and loss of support has been placed on a twofold basis. Accordingly, interest shall run from the date of the incident in respect of that part of the award corresponding to the period for which earnings are known, and from the date of judgment in respect of that part corresponding to the period for which they are not. The same provision further contemplates the proportional set-off of sums paid by way of performance prior to the commencement of the examination stage.
The provision places on a statutory footing a long-standing controversy in tort actions as to the commencement of interest. Indeed, in actions in which a distinction is drawn between the active period (until retirement age) and the passive period (thereafter), the date from which interest is to run had constituted a persistent source of dispute between the parties.
Assessed from a practical standpoint, the running of interest from the date of the incident in respect of sums attributable to the active period in the expert’s calculation produces a result favourable to the claimant. Conversely, the fact that interest will run only from the date of judgment in respect of sums relating to the passive period will limit the interest recoverable on that portion in proceedings of long duration.
IV. RECOURSE AGAINST DECISIONS DEFERRING THE ANNOUNCEMENT OF THE VERDICT
Article 231 of the Code of Criminal Procedure [“CCrP”] has been redrafted so as to open the way to appeal against decisions deferring the announcement of the verdict. It has been provided that the limitation period for prosecution shall be suspended during the supervision period, and that, in the event of a breach of the supervision obligations, the court may order that part of the sentence not be executed or that it be suspended or converted into an alternative sanction. The offences of torture, torment and ill-treatment falling within Article 17 of the Constitution have been excluded from the scope of the provision.
By its judgment dated 20 July 2022, Case No. 2021/121, Decision No. 2022/88, the Constitutional Court annulled Article 231/12 of the CCrP, which provided for objection as the sole avenue of recourse against decisions deferring the announcement of the verdict. In the view of the Court, that provision infringed the individual’s right to apply to a competent authority, in that it made no provision for a definite and effective avenue by which the compatibility with the requirements of a democratic society, and the proportionality, of interferences with fundamental rights and freedoms might be reviewed.[5] The Court further held that directing the accused, before the stage of judgment has even been reached, towards a declaration of intent which also amounts to a waiver of the right of appeal fails to satisfy the conditions of constitutional validity in the light of the rule of law and of the principles of legality and proportionality.
By its judgment dated 1 June 2023, Case No. 2022/120, Decision No. 2023/107, the Court annulled paragraphs 5 to 14 of Article 231 of the CCrP in their entirety. In that judgment it was observed that the institution gave rise, by reason of its connection with impunity, to difficulties in respect of the right to life and the prohibition of torture and ill-treatment, that it constituted an interference with numerous fundamental rights and freedoms, foremost among them freedom of expression and the right to hold meetings and demonstration marches, and that it contained no safeguard against arbitrary application. In the Court’s view, the impossibility of reviewing on appeal whether the first instance court has afforded the guarantees of a fair trial to accused persons who consent to deferral at the outset of the proceedings is liable to give rise to violations of rights.[6]
Following these judgments, the legislature redrafted Article 231/12 of the CCrP by Law No. 7499 so as to provide for an appeal against decisions deferring the announcement of the verdict. However, since the provisions of Article 272/3 of the CCrP are reserved, the avenue of appeal remains closed in respect of convictions carrying a judicial fine of up to and including fifteen thousand Turkish Liras and in respect of judgments declared final by law.
V. REDUCTION OF SENTENCE FOR PARTICIPATION IN QUALIFIED FRAUD
Pursuant to the fourth paragraph added to Article 158 of the Turkish Penal Code, where participation in fraud is confined to the act of supplying card or account details or of acting as an intermediary, the sentence shall be reduced by one half. The provision further affords those falling within the same scope a special form of effective remorse, conditional upon the loss being made good within six months.
The controversy as to whether the conduct of persons who allow third parties to make use of their account or IBAN details amounts to co-perpetration[7] or to aiding and abetting[8] has been ongoing, and files of this kind have in recent years occupied a considerable place in the caseload of the criminal courts. By operation of the principle of the more favourable law, the question of applying the provision to actions commenced before its entry into force and still pending will also arise.
IN SUMMARY
Law No. 7589 places on a statutory footing a series of questions that had long remained contentious in practice, though a number of the solutions adopted have served to displace the controversy rather than to bring it to an end. The repeal of the action for an unquantified debt accords with the views advanced to that effect in the doctrine. The debate is not, however, wholly closed. The concern underlying the introduction of the institution was to protect the procedural safeguards available to a claimant unable to quantify its claim precisely at the time of bringing the action; regard being had to that concern, it may be argued that a limited amendment addressing the criterion of determinacy might have been preferred to the wholesale abolition of the institution.[9] Indeed, the conflicting judgments of the Court of Cassation which emerged over the institution’s fifteen years of application, particularly in employment disputes, and which could not be resolved even by way of a judgment on the unification of case law, likewise laid the ground for the views in the doctrine favouring outright repeal.[10] The new regime, in consolidating the protective functions of the action for an unquantified debt within the partial action, seeks to reduce the procedural risks to which that distinction gave rise.
The redrafting of Article 231 of the CCrP so as to open the appeal to the regional court of appeal against decisions deferring the announcement of the verdict is the natural corollary of the successive violation judgments of the Constitutional Court; the reservation of Article 272/3 of the CCrP, however, partially curtails the object of those judgments by leaving the avenue of recourse closed in respect of judicial fines and judgments final in character. As for the reduction of sentence provided for in cases of participation in qualified fraud, it does not resolve the divergence in the case law as to whether the supply of account or card details is to be regarded as co-perpetration or as aiding and abetting; on the contrary, in providing a separate and reduced sentencing regime for such conduct, it opts to produce a practical solution from outside the debate on characterisation.
In sum, it is clear that Law No. 7589 furnishes a statutory answer to questions long under discussion; in particular, the consolidation of the functions of the action for an unquantified debt within the partial action and the linking of statutory interest to economic indicators address two significant difficulties in practice directly. While the effect of these provisions in practice will become clear only in time, it may be said that the Law brings about a significant change as regards procedural foreseeability and the preservation of the real value of a claim.
Footnotes
[1] Grand National Assembly of Türkiye, Legislative Term 23, Legislative Year 3, Serial No. 393, Draft Code of Civil Procedure and Report of the Justice Committee (1/574), pp. 143-145.
[2] Court of Cassation, 9th Civil Chamber, Case No. 2014/31734, Decision No. 2014/35646: “This Chamber consistently accepts that the condition of a legal interest is a curable condition of action. Accordingly, where an action for an unquantified debt or a partial action has been brought and the claim forming the subject matter of the action is clearly and fully quantified, the claimant must first be granted time to bring an action for full performance and thus to satisfy the curable condition of a legal interest; should the claimant fail to do so within the time granted, the action must be dismissed on procedural grounds for want of a legal interest.” To the same effect, see Court of Cassation, 9th Civil Chamber, Case No. 2012/1756, Decision No. 2012/5741: “The first instance court held that the claim forming the subject matter of the action was quantified and that the claimant had no legal interest in bringing a partial action. The condition of a legal interest, being a condition of action, is among those capable of being remedied. On that footing, it was incorrect for the court to dismiss the action on procedural grounds without first granting counsel for the claimant a peremptory period of one week under Article 115/2 of the CCP in order to proceed by way of an action for full performance and thereby remedy the deficiency in the condition of a legal interest.”
[3] Court of Cassation, 22nd Civil Chamber, Case No. 2014/16510, Decision No. 2015/28942: “It should further be made clear at this point that, where an action is stated in the statement of claim to be brought as an action for an unquantified debt although the conditions therefor are not met, the action must be dismissed for want of a legal interest without any time being granted to the claimant. That is because the Law does not permit such an action to be brought where the claim is capable of being quantified. In such a case the action must be dismissed for want of a legal interest in bringing an action for an unquantified debt, and no additional time should be granted.” To the same effect, see Court of Cassation, 22nd Civil Chamber, Case No. 2016/11732, Decision No. 2019/9354: “In these circumstances it is clear that the claim for annual leave pay forming the subject matter of the action is in reality a quantifiable claim and cannot therefore form the subject matter of an action for an unquantified debt. For that reason, since the claim for annual leave pay cannot constitute the subject matter of an action for an unquantified debt, it was incorrect to proceed to the merits rather than to dismiss the action in respect of that claim for want of a legal interest.”
[4] Constitutional Court, 22 July 2025, Case No. 2024/24, Decision No. 2025/164: “The updating of sums awarded by way of compensation or of other claims so as to strip out the effects of inflation, in other words the application of interest in such a manner as to compensate for the appreciable loss in value over the period between the date on which entitlement to the claim arose and the date of payment, is a means capable of preventing a claim falling within the scope of the right to property from losing its value in the face of inflation.”
[5] Constitutional Court, 20 July 2022, Case No. 2021/121, Decision No. 2022/88: “The provision, in stipulating that objection lies against decisions deferring the announcement of the verdict, makes no provision for a definite and effective avenue of review by which the submissions and evidence of those having recourse to that remedy may be taken into account, the competing interests balanced, and the compatibility with the requirements of a democratic society, and the proportionality, of the interference with fundamental rights and freedoms determined. This infringes the right to be afforded the opportunity to apply to a competent authority, an opportunity accorded to the individual for the redress of interferences with fundamental rights and freedoms and for the prevention of arbitrary conduct on the part of those exercising public power. It is indeed apparent that the provision cannot be applied in a manner meeting these requirements. The absence of an examination of this kind, bearing directly upon the regime governing the restriction of fundamental rights and freedoms, is incompatible with the right to an effective remedy.”
[6] Constitutional Court, 1 June 2023, Case No. 2022/120, Decision No. 2023/107: “As regards accused persons who consent to the application of deferral at the very outset of the proceedings, review of whether the guarantees of the right to a fair trial were afforded by the first instance court at the subsequent stages of the proceedings cannot be carried out on appeal, and this is liable to give rise to violations of rights.”
[7] As to co-perpetration, see Court of Cassation, 11th Criminal Chamber, Case No. 2023/214, Decision No. 2023/263: “the accused … and …, at the request of the accused …, procured account details and bank cards belonging to third parties, the accused … made use of his own account and bank card, the sums credited to the accounts were withdrawn by the accused themselves and handed over to the accused … in return for a given share, and the role and contribution assumed by the accused in the commission of the offence completed the acts of the accused …, such that the accused exercised joint dominion over the acts; it was accordingly incorrect, rather than sentencing the accused as co-perpetrators, to impose an inadequate sentence by applying a reduction under Article 39 of Law No. 5237 on the ground that their conduct was in the nature of aiding and abetting…” To the same effect, see Court of Cassation, 11th Criminal Chamber, Case No. 2024/2705, Decision No. 2024/8310; 11th Criminal Chamber, Case No. 2021/31139, Decision No. 2024/10927; 6th Criminal Chamber, Case No. 2020/3389, Decision No. 2021/84.
[8] As to aiding and abetting, see Court of Cassation, 11th Criminal Chamber, Case No. 2023/2909, Decision No. 2023/6665: “the conduct of the accused …, consisting in giving his bank account number to the accused … in the knowledge that an offence would be committed, facilitated the commission of the offence by rendering assistance prior to the commission of qualified fraud, and he thereby participated in the act of qualified fraud in the capacity of an aider and abettor; the failure to have regard to the fact that the accused … ought to have been sentenced in the capacity of an aider and abettor was found contrary to law.” To the same effect, see 15th Criminal Chamber, Case No. 2017/36376, Decision No. 2018/9968.
[9] Pekcanıtez, Hakan, Belirsiz Alacak Davası (HMK m. 107) [The Action for an Unquantified Debt (Article 107 CCP)], Yetkin Yayınları, 2011, p. 89: “Where it is impossible for the claimant to quantify its claim at the time of bringing the action, or where quantification cannot be expected of it, compelling the claimant to specify the relief sought in the statement of claim gives rise to numerous adverse consequences from the standpoint both of substantive law and of procedural law. In our country, where limitation periods are short, this gives rise to still greater difficulties. A claimant who specifies a high figure in the statement of claim faces the risk of being ordered to pay substantial costs in respect of the portion dismissed as excessive. Should it specify a low figure, it will not recover its claim in full. Should it reserve the remainder of its claim, it faces the risk that the limitation period will expire where the relief sought is increased in the course of the proceedings. In addition, the bringing of a separate action in respect of the reserved portion of the claim is not consonant with procedural economy.”
[10] Yılmaz, Ejder, “Uygulamada Amacına Ulaşamayan Belirsiz Alacak Davasına İlişkin Hüküm Yürürlükten Kaldırılmalıdır” [The Provision on the Action for an Unquantified Debt, Having Failed to Attain Its Purpose in Practice, Should Be Repealed], YÜHFD, Vol. XVIII, No. 2, 2021, pp. 695-726, at 720-721. The author, observing that the confusion in the case law arising in employment disputes undermines the principle of legal certainty, states his view that the institution today “does more harm than good”.
